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Incontestable Trademark Rights and Equitable
Defenses in Infringement Litigation
I. INTRODUCTION
When President Truman signed the Lanham Act' into law
on July 5, 1946, the United States, for the first time, provided
comprehensive national protection of trademarks.2 One of the
benefits accorded federal registrants under the Act is the possi-
bility that the registrant's right to use a trademark may become
"incontestable."3 The expanded protection given an owner of
incontestable trademark rights is considerable, because the
owner's right to use the trademark may be attacked only on
limited grounds.4 Although the courts traditionally have distin-
guished between offensive and defensive assertion of incontest-
able trademark rights,5 recent decisions appear to confirm that
1. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as the Lanham Act].
2. The Lanham Act is based upon the commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, and a trademark owner's rights are established when a trademark is
"used in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976). The Act was the culmination of
twenty-six years of effort by business, the bar, and Congress to reform the
Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1976)). For a discussion of the history and development of the Lanham
Act, see D. ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL 233-37 (1947); Carter, Legis-
lative History of the New Trade-Mark Act, 36 TRADE-MARK REP. 121 (1946); Rog-
ers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAw &
CoNTEmp. PRoBs. 173 (1949).
3. The owner of a federally registered trademark may gain "incontesta-
ble" rights from the operation of three sections of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1064, 1065 & 1115(b) (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 15-20. The ef-
fect of an incontestable registration when its owner seeks to enforce rights in
court is covered by section 1115(b), which makes an incontestable registration
"conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered
mark in commerce," subject to several exceptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1976)
(emphasis added).
The use of the term "incontestable" is misleading. As the word appeared
in early versions of the Act, it characterized the accrued trademark rights with
a reasonable degree of accuracy. Subsequent drafts, however, placed increased
restrictions on the scope of the concept. See Ooms & Frost, Incontestability, 14
LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoBS. 220, 221 (1949). Nevertheless, because the statute itself
uses the term "incontestable," and because of the overwhelming use of the
description by courts and commenators, this Note assumes that usage.
4. The grounds for attacking an incontestable registration are stated ex-
plicitly in the statute. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1065 & 1115(b) (1976); infra text ac-
companying notes 15-20.
5. Some courts asserted that incontestable rights could be used defen-
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the benefits of incontestability are uniformly available. 6 It is
still unclear, however, whether equitable defenses may be
raised in litigation to defeat registered marks that have become
incontestable under the Lanham Act.7
This Note evaluates the merits of proscribing equitable de-
fenses against owners of incontestable trademark rights. The
Note begins by examining the basic purposes of trademark pro-
tection recognized by the sponsors of the Lanham Act, and de-
scribes the attributes of incontestability accorded federal
registrations. It next identifies arguments that have been of-
fered in favor of allowing equitable defenses against incontesta-
ble registrations, but contends through statutory analysis that
the Lanham Act does not permit the assertion of equitable de-
fenses in litigation when incontestable trademark rights are in-
volved. The Note briefly reviews judicial treatment of the issue,
and concludes with a policy analysis, arguing that the role of
sively but not offensively-incontestable rights could shield the owner's regis-
tration and use, but could not add to the owner's rights to exclude others. See,
e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 979 (M.D.
Tenn. 1971), affd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972). In practice, this dichotomy re-
moved all meaning from the incontestability provisions in the statute when the
registrant was the plaintiff in infringement litigation. For a discussion of the
judicial development of the offensive-defensive distinction, see Note, Trade-
Marks-Incontestability-Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 18 B.C. IN-
DUS. & COM. L. REV. 396, 408 (1977).
6. The court in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc. soundly rejected
the offensive-defensive distinction. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976). See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text. The decision, which
held that offensive use of incontestable rights was clearly permissible, has been
almost uniformly followed. See United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees,
639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981); Soweco v. Shell ORl Co., 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); United States Jaycees v. Chicago Jr. Ass'n of
Com. & Indus., 505 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The Eighth Circuit, which a
year prior to Union Carbide had expressed approval of the offensive-defensive
distinction, has since indicated that it may reconsider its position. Compare
Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co., 516 F.2d 846, 851 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975) with Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co.,
578 F.2d 727, 731 nA (8th Cir. 1978). For decisions equivocal on the Union Car-
bide position, see Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 845-
46, 847 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Armand's Subway v. Doctor's Assocs., 202 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 305, 311-12 (E.D. Va. 1978).
7. "[T]here is some disagreement whether section 1115(b) precludes the
defenses of waiver, acquiescence and estoppel .... " Koppers Co. v. Krupp-
Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 847 (W.D. Pa. 1981). See also R. DoLE, TERRI-
TORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 70 (1965); 1 J. GIL ON,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 4.03(3) (1980 & Supp. 1982); 2 J. Mc-
CARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:44 (1973 & Supp. 1981); Dig-
gins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 147, 195 (1947); Note, Trademark
Incontestability-Time for the Next Step, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1196, 1205 (1966); De-
velopments in the Law--Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv. L.
REV. 814, 830 (1955).
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equity in the enforcement of private trademark rights must be
considered incidental to protection of the public from confusion
as to the source and quality of goods and services in the
marketplace.
I. THE LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act recognized two basic goals underlying
protective trademark legislation: protection of the public from
confusion and deception as to the quality and source of goods
and services and the assurance of an owner's goodwill invest-
ment.8 Congress reasoned that these goals would be achieved
most effectively through a system of national registration of
trademarks. 9 Federal trademark law protects the symbolic and
investment value of the trademark, and tends to stabilize the
marketplace by mitigating the risk of consumers being con-
fused or deceived with respect to either the goods and services
themselves or their origin.10 The Lanham Act attempts to obvi-
8. These goals were articulated by the Senate Committee on Patents dur-
ing its final consideration of the bill. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274, 1276. Legislative history relating
to amendments of the Lanham Act also expresses this view. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 1400, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7132, 7136. For a list of other reasons given for enactment of the 1946 legislation,
see S. REP. No. 1333, supra at 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at
1276.
9. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 8, at 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERv. at 1277 ("[A] sound public policy requires that trademarks should
receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given them."). Federal re-
gistration procedures seek to ieduce potential conflict by: (1) publishing
marks that have become "registrable" in the Oficial Gazette, which serves as
"constructive notice" to other potential users, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1062, 1072 (1976);
(2) providing for opposition proceedings to be initiated within 30 days by any
persons who believe they would be damaged by the registration, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1063 (1976); and by allowing (3) cancellation proceedings, 15 U.S.C. § 1064
(1976) and (4) concurrent use and interference proceedings, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052,
1066, 1067 (1976). See generally In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466 (C.C.P.A.
1970). Controversies in these contexts are heard by the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (T.T.A.B.), see 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (1976). Appeal may be to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), with review by the United
States Supreme Court, see 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976). Persons dissatisfied with
T.T.B. decisions may file a civil action in federal district court. Id.
10. The Lanham Act sponsors' recognition of protection of the public from
confusion as a central purpose of trademark legislation restated common law
docrine. As early as 1882, the Supreme Court observed that a trademark owner
is entitled to protection, "not only as a matter of justice to him, but to prevent
imposition upon the public." Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 223
(1882). For a recent statement of this consideration, see James Burrough, Ltd.
v. Sign of the Beefeater, 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976). See also infra text accom-
panying note 116. The test of both common law trademark infringement and
federal statutory trademark infringement is whether the public is "likely to be
confused." See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 253 (1877); 15 U.S.C. § 1114
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ate deception with respect to goods and services themselves by
preventing the registration or use of confusing marks for prod-
ucts or services having the same descriptive characteristics."
Reliability of source is assured through prevention of the regis-
tration or use of marks that might lead the consumer to believe
that goods and services bearing a particular mark were pro-
vided by a company that in fact had no connection with the
perceived supplier.12
Congress's perception that trademarks serve a beneficial
role in the marketplace13 gave rise to the Lanham Act's strong
national protection provisions, including the incontestability
sections.' 4 Three sections of the Act combine to define the full
scope of incontestable trademark rights,15 and a fourth section
defines the rights of registrants in the absence of incontestabil-
ity.'6 A trademark owner must meet the requirements set forth
in section 1065 for the owner's mark to achieve incontestable
status.17 Section 1065 generally provides that once a mark has
been registered and continuously used in commerce for five
years, the right of the registrant to use the mark in connection
with the goods or services listed in the registration becomes in-
contestable upon a filing of the proper affidavit with the Patent
and Trademark Office.18 Section 1064 describes the grounds
upon which federal registrations may be cancelled, and in cer-
tain circumstances even provides for the cancellation of incon-
testable trademark registrations.19 Section 1115(b) grants
(1976) (providing that use of a mark by the alleged infringer will be unlawful if
it is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"). For a cata-
log of the factors courts generally consider in determining likelihood of confu-
sion, see Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1064(c), 1065(4), 1115(b) (4) (1976). See also supra
note 9.
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052(d), 1064(c), 1066, 1114(1), 1115(b) (3) (1976).
13. See supra text accompanying note 8.
14. See 92 CONG. REC. 7524 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Lanham).
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1065, 1115(b) (1976).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1976).
18. Within the limitations of section 1065, an incontestable right to use the
mark is a defense to a cancellation proceeding-and, except as modified by sec-
tion 1115(b), may be asserted offensively or defensively in an infringement ac-
tion. See generally supra notes 5 & 6. Section 1065 incorporates by reference
the principal exceptions to section 1064, see infra note 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1065
(1976).
19. A trademark is not completely incontestable, but remains subject to
cancellation throughout its existence if any of the grounds listed in section
1064(c)-(e) are proved. Cancellation may occur if the registered mark becomes
the common descriptive name of an item, or has been abandoned, or if its regis-
tration was fraudulently obtained, or if the registered mark is being used by, or
1070 [Vol. 66:1067
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marks with incontestable registrations a conclusive evidentiary
presumption of the right of exclusive use, and enumerates
seven exceptions to incontestability which the opposing party
may raise against the owner of the mark in infringement
actions.20
If a federal registration has not yet achieved incontestable
status, section 1115(a) 21 defines the owner's rights. Subsection
(a) states that the registration shall be prima facie evidence of
the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in connection
with the goods or services listed in the registration. Under this
with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the
goods or services in connection with which the mark is used. 15 U.S.C. § 1064
(1976).
20. These "defenses or defects" to incontestability are: (1) that the regis-
tration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudulently;
(2) that the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; (3) that the regis-
tered mark is being used to misrepresent the source of the goods or services in
connection with which the mark is used; (4) that the use of the mark charged
to be an infringement is a use of the party's individual name in his own busi-
ness, or of a term or device that is descriptive of and used fairly and in good
faith only to describe to users the goods or services of such party, or their geo-
graphic origin; (5) that the mark whose use by a party charged as an infringe-
ment was adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been
continuously used by such party from a date prior to registration or publication
of the mark, but this defense or defect applies only for the area in which such
continuous prior use is proved; (6) that the mark whose use is charged as an
infringement was registered and used prior to registration under this Act or
publication under section 12(c) of the Act, but this defense or defect applies
only for the area in which the mark was used prior to such registration or pub-
lication of the registrant's mark, (7) that the mark has been or is being used to
violate the antitrust laws of the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1976).
Courts and commentators have disagreed as to the effect of a successful as-
sertion of one of the enumerated legal defenses. One view is that the defenses
are complete defenses which prevent the trademark holder from obtaining any
relief against the defendant infringer. See Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J-.
Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966). Another view maintains
that the defenses merely deprive the incontestable registration of its conclusive
evidentiary value and reduce the registration to prima facie evidence of the
owner's exclusive right to use the mark. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970)
(modifying district court opinion on other grounds), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905
(1971). For purposes of this Note, however, the distinction is not of immediate
concern. If equitable defenses were allowed in addition to the seven enumer-
ated defenses in section 1115(b), and were not treated as complete defenses,
they would at a minimum operate to deprive the mark of incontestable status
and place it within the purview of section 1115(a). Trademarks governed by
section 1115(a) are subject to "any legal or equitable defense or defect." 15
U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, if equitable defenses were
available against incontestable rights, either of the views mentioned above
would allow the equitable defense to function as a complete defense to the
plaintiff's claim of exclusive right of use of the trademark. See 1 J. GiIsoN,
supra note 7, § 4.03(3) at 4-24.4 to 4-25, 4-31 to 4-32; see also R. DOLE, .supra note
7, at 60-74.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976).
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subsection, however, an opposing party may raise any legal or
equitable defense that might have been asserted if the mark
had not been registered.22
M. AVAILABILITY OF EQUITABLE DEFENSES
An unsettled aspect of litigation brought under the Lanham
Act is whether a defendant may challenge a plaintiff-registrant
who invokes the benefits of incontestability only on the
grounds specifically enumerated in section 1115(b), or whether
a defendant may also properly raise equitable defenses. 2 3 , The
question is an important one. Under the first view a defend-
ant's equitable arguments are insufficient as a matter of law to
cause forfeiture of an owner's exclusive right to use a mark, al-
though such arguments may be considered in determining the
appropriate injunctive relief.24 Under the opposing view, the
defendant would have the opportunity to foreclose entirely the
plaintiff's right to exclusive use of the mark.25
22. Id.
23. See supra note 7.
24. The Lanham Act allows injunctive relief to be granted "according to
the principles of equity." 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976). See United States Jaycees v.
Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981). "We agree with [defendants]
... that incontestability neither makes unnecessary a showing of likelihood of
confusion, nor precludes all discretion in the fashioning of injunctive relief."
Id. at 137 n.3.
25. A successfully asserted equitable defense, if allowed to determine sub-
stantive rights, would prevent the plaintiff-registrant from obtaining any relief
against the defendant infringer. See 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 1369, at 990 (5th ed. 1941) ("The right constituting an equitable defense may
be one which ... is purely defensive ... and which simply operates to bar the
plaintiffs action."). Of course, it is conceivable that even a court which favored
the elimination of equitable defenses would not be prevented from effectively
precluding injunctive relief under section 1116 by refusing to give any scope to
the injunction. In those circumstances, raising equitable considerations that
resulted in a withdrawal of equitable relief would lead to the same net effect as
asserting a complete equitable defense. It is difficult, however, to imagine this
occurring as a practical matter for several reasons. First, once a substantive le-
gal right is clearly established, it would be psychologically difficult for a court
to deny all relief when there has been an infringement of that right. Further-
more, section 1116 speaks in terms of "granting" an injunction; the implication
of "granting"-an affirmative act-militates against constricting the effect of the
"grant" to the point where it becomes meaningless. In addition, consumer in-
terests become an overriding factor in support of some restriction on one of the
parties' use of the mark. See supra note 10, infra text accompanying notes 103-
16. When the plaintiff has a substantive right and the defendant merely has an
equitable claim against enforcing that right, the court would be more likely to
enforce the right, because its enforcement also would give rise to a remedy that
has the effect of protecting consumers from confusion in the marketplace. It is
possible for a court to issue injunctions prohibiting both parties from using
their marks, but instances of this would occur only in extraordinary circum-
stances, because the public interest in maintaining the integrity of a symbol
[Vol. 66:10671072
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Equitable defenses typically raised in an infringement suit
are laches, acquiescence, and estoppel.26 These defenses are
clearly available at common law, 27 in inter partes proceedings
before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals,28 and in litigation under the Lan-
ham Act involving marks that have not obtained incontestable
status. 29 In addition, defendants have commonly raised the doc-
trine of unclean hands as an equitable defense in trademark
proceedings and litigation. 30
Equitable principles traditionally have been important in
the development of trademark law. 31 Trademark protection is
the consumer associates with the source or quality of a particular product
would still have to be considered. See Best Foods v. General Mills, 3 F.R.D. 459,
462-63 n.4 (D. Del. 1944). Finally, unlike other areas of the law, the legal reme-
dies available to a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit are for the most
part of little value, so that denial of an injunction effectively prevents the plain-
tiff from obtaining any worthwhile relief. For an example of the limits of per-
missible restrictions on the scope of injunctive relief, see United States Jaycees
v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981), vacating and modifying 490
F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
26. For an explanation of these defenses in the trademark context, see J.
CAM E, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAm COMPETITION § 15.01, at 678 (1970).
27. See 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 31:1-20. Even under the common
law, however, courts sometimes attempted to deal with the problem of con-
sumer confusion by placing restrictions on these defenses. Thus, it was some-
times said that while laches might prevent the award of damages or an
accounting for profits, it would not bar injunctive relief. See McLean v. Flem-
ing, 96 U.S. 245 (1877). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 887-
88.
28. Section 1069 of the Lanham Act provides: "In all inter partes proceed-
ings equitable principles of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, where applica-
ble may be considered and applied." 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (1976). Inter partes
proceedings are cancellation, opposition, or concurrent use proceedings before
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (T.T-A-B.) and appeals therefrom to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063, 1064,
1066-71 (1976); supra note 9; infra note 48. See also Blynn, Litigation Before the
TTAB and CCPA: The Equitable Defenses, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 367 (1980).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976); supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
30. See Warnaco, Inc. v. Adventure Knits, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 307, 312
(T.TAB. 1981) (Board stated that the application of equitable principles in in-
ter partes proceedings requires that a complainant come into the proceedings
with clean hands); Cooper, "Unclean Hands" and "Unlawful Use in Commerce'"
Trademarks Adrift on the Regulatory Tide, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 38 (1981);
Note, The Besmirched Plaintiff and the Confused Public: Unclean Hands in
Trademark Infringement, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 109 (1965). Even under the com-
mon law, however, courts sometimes questioned the soundness of permitting
the unclean hands defense when public confusion might result. See Best
Foods v. General Mills, 3 F.R.D. 459, 462-63 n.4 (D. DeL 1944); see also Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 7, at 887-88.
31. See R. DOLE, supra note 7, at 5; W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQuITY §§ 41,
46 (1930). The equitable relief of an injunction is the most attractive remedy in
trademark litigation, because it prevents both further confusion in the market-
place and the continued weakening of the trademark. For a discussion of the
107319821
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
part of the law of unfair competition,32 which is a product of eq-
uity.33 Thus, although some courts have interpreted the Lan-
ham Act as a clear directive proscribing equitable defenses
against incontestable trademark rights, others have been reluc-
tant to reject those defenses entirely. Two reasons may under-
lie this judicial reluctance to foreclose equitable defenses.
First, because trademark suits invariably involve demands for
equitable relief, it is reasonable for a court to want to allow de-
fenses normally cognizable in a court of equity.34 The maxim
that equity refuses to aid a party guilty of inequitable conduct
in a matter intimately connected with the litigation is a power-
ful psychological component of equitable jurisprudence,35 and
courts may not fully understand that a prohibition of equitable
defenses against incontestable trademark rights does not elimi-
nate consideration of equitable principles in awarding relief.36
Second, some courts have found the statutory language of the
Lanham Act sufficiently ambiguous to permit the assertion of
equitable defenses.37 The conclusion of these courts is that
congressional intent to deny equitable defenses to substantive
rights should not be assumed, absent the clearest evidence.38
A. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Proponents for allowing equitable defenses to be raised
against incontestable trademark rights argue that, because sec-
tion 1115(b) does not expressly exclude equitable defenses,
and because section 1069 provides that in all inter partes pro-
ceedings the equitable defenses of laches, estoppel, and acqui-
escence may be considered and applied,39 these defenses
historical development of the trademark action in law and equity, see Ropski,
The Federal Trademark Jury Trial-Awakening of a Dormant Constitutional
Right, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 177, 179-82 (1980).
32. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf; 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); S. REP.
No. 1333, supra note 8, at 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SEr. at 1275.
33. See W. WALSH, supra note 31, at § 47.
34. See generally 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 30.3 (balancing the eq-
uities between plaintiff and defendant).
35. See Chafee, Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV.
877, 877 (1949).
36. See supra note 24;, infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 39-62.
38. Cf. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960). The Court
held, construing the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, that "[t]he comprehen-
siveness of... equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the ab-
sence of a clear and valid legislative command." Id. at 291 (quoting Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 297-98 (1946)).
39. See supra note 28.
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should be available against incontestable trademark rights. 40
This argument, however, contravenes a fair construction of the
statute.41 Section 1115(b) states that if the right to use the reg-
istered mark has become incontestable under section 1065, "the
registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's ex-
clusive right to use the registered mark in commerce ... ex-
cept when one of the following defenses or defects is
established .... ,42 On its face, the language of section
1115(b) grants an exclusive right except when certain defenses
are proved; in other words, section 1115(b) narrows the avail-
able defenses from "any legal or equitable defense or defect" of
section 1115(a) 4 3 to the seven enumerated defenses. 44 Of the
seven defenses, at least one, abandonment, is considered to be
an equitable defense.45 Since Congress was aware of equitable
defenses46 and could have inserted additional ones had it so de-
sired, its failure to include equitable defenses in addition to
abandonment suggests that equitable defenses were purpose-
fully omitted from the list of available defenses.47
The argument that equitable principles should be applied
to section 1115(b) on the basis of section 1069 is extremely ten-
uous. Because an infringement suit is not an inter partes pro-
ceeding,48 section 1069 is inapplicable to trademark litigation.
40. See Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928,
955 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court apparently relied upon section 1069 to conclude that
the defendant could raise the equitable defenses of laches, estoppel, and acqui-
escence against plaintiff's incontestable trademark rights); Note, supra note 7,
at 1205.
41. The same rules of statutory interpretation govern in courts of equity
and law. See generally E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 179
(1940); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 15 (14th ed. 1918),
quoted in McDowell, Joseph Story's "Science" of Equity, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 153,
160 (1980).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1976).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
44. See supra note 20.
45. See J. CAUmAFDE, supra note 26, § 15.01 at 678. Some other section
1115(b) exceptions may bear a relationship to equitable principles. For a dis-
cussion of the policies underlying these exceptions, see infra note 115.
46. In addition to mentioning "equitable defense [s]" in section 1115(a), the
statute refers to specific equitable defenses in section 1069, see supra note 28,
and to "the principles of equity" in section 1116, see supra note 24. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1069, 1115(a), 1116 (1976).
47. Cf. 1 J. GiLSON, supra note 7, § 4.03(3) at 4-24.1 (similar argument made
to support proscription of other, nonequitable defenses not inicluded in the sec-
tion); Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 830 (the listing of so common a
defense as the "fair use" defense, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4), "may indicate that the
defenses enumerated were meant to be exclusive"). See supra note 20 for a
discussion of the evidentiary effect of proving one of the section 1115(b)
exceptions.
48. Inter partes proceedings involve the trademark registration process, in-
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The two situations involve different considerations. In inter
partes proceedings, it is the federal applicant or registrant who
is given the equitable defense benefits of section 1069, while in
litigation the nonregistrant is invariably given the benefits. Al-
lowing equitable defenses to benefit a federal applicant or reg-
istrant encourages national registration, and prevents parties
from sleeping on their alleged trademark rights and later using
them to the detriment of another. Thus, when a party attempts
cancellation of a registration after a long delay, laches may bar
the action, thereby preserving the public's reliance on the new
registrant's mark. Granting equitable defenses to nonregistrant
defendant litigants, however, would serve neither the Act's pur-
pose of encouraging federal registration nor its goal of protect-
ing public reliance and an owner's investment in goodwill.49 To
the contrary, granting equitable defenses would cause federal
registration to lose some of its attractiveness, and might totally
undermine the public's reliance on the plaintiff's mark.5O
Standard canons of statutory construction also provide that
all sections of an act relating to the same subject matter should
be interpreted together.5 ' The sections of the Lanham Act di-
rectly relating to incontestability are sections 1064, 1065, and
cluding (1) opposition proceedings, in which the opposer seeks to prevent issu-
ance of a registration to the applicant, which must commence within 30 days
after publication on the principal register, 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1976); (2) cancella-
tion proceedings, in which the petitioner seeks to obtain cancellation of a regis-
tration already issued to the registrant, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976); and
(3) concurrent use proceedings, in which both parties seek registration cover-
age for the same or similar mark under conditions which insure that confusion
is unlikely, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1066, 1067 (1976). Interference proceedings, which
the Patent and Trademark Office initiate, and at which the right to registration
as between pending applications or between a pending application and a regis-
tration are determined, are not allowed against an incontestable registration.
15 U.S.C. § 1066 (1976). See also 1 J. GasoN, supra note 7, § 3.05(1) at 3-72.1.
Thus, incontestable trademark rights are implicated only in the context of can-
cellation inter partes proceedings, because the time period there may extend
beyond five years. Section 1064 governs such cancellations. 15 U.S.C. § 1064
(1976); see supra note 19. For a general discussion of the equitable defenses in
inter partes proceedings, see Blynn, supra note 28.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 8 & 9. The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals has indicated that in cases of concurrent use it will reward
those who first seek federal registration of their trademark. See In re Beatrice
Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 474 n.14 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
50. To the extent that substantive trademark rights under the Lanham Act
might be defeated by equitable defenses, federal registrations become less at-
tractive. For a discussion of the public's reliance problem resulting from al-
lowing equitable defenses, see infra text accompanying notes 102-29.
51. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.06 at 81
(4th ed. 1973) (a revision of the third edition of Sutherland Statutory
Construction).
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1115.52 Each of these sections operates independently, al-
though they obviously complement one another. Of these sec-
tions, the only one that refers to equitable defenses is
subsection (a) of section 1115. Subsection (a) provides that a
registered mark "shall be prima facie evidence of registrant's
exclusive right to use the registered mark... but shall not pre-
clude an opposing party from proving any legal or equitable de-
fense or defect which might have been asserted if such mark
had not been registered."53 Because Congress specifically men-
tions equitable defenses in subsection (a), while omitting any
such reference in subsection (b), it is reasonable to conclude
that the omission in subsection (b) was not an oversight.54
Some courts and commentators rely upon section 1116 of
the Lanham Act to argue that, although a registrant may have
an incontestable registration, the court may decline to give sub-
stantive effect to the owner's incontestable rights, and may re-
fuse to issue an injunction if the defendant proves an equitable
defense.55 Section 1116 provides that the courts have power "to
grant injunctions according to the principles of equity."56 Ref-
erences to equitable principles in section 1116, however, do not
necessarily favor application of those principles to section
1115(b). Arguing that section 1115(b) does not foreclose equita-
ble defenses, because section 1116 requires the court to grant
injunctive relief according to equitable principles, confuses the
issues involved. There is a basic distinction between the estab-
lishment of a right and the remedy provided to relieve viola-
tions of that right. The judicial remedy is the law's mechanism
for vindicating or enforcing the substantive right that has been
violated.57 Thus, while sections 1065 and 1115(b) create a con-
clusive presumption of exclusive trademark rights subject to
certain enumerated defenses, section 1116 defines the applica-
ble remedy once a violation of those rights has been
established.58
52. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
54. See 1 J. GiLsoN, supra note 7, § 4.03(3) at 4-23 to 4-24.1; see also R.
DOLE, supra note 7, at 70 (noting that such an inference is possible but that
some cases have held differently).
55. See, e.g., Cuban Cigar Brands N. V. v. Upmann Int'l, Inc., 457 F. Supp.
1090, 1092 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1978); 2 J. McCarthy, supra
note 7, § 32:44 at 496-97.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976).
57. See E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQurrY AND EQurrABLE REMEDIES
220 (1975).
58. See supra notes 24-25. The Supreme Court found similar language in
the injunctive relief provision of the antitrust laws to be no evidence of con-
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The legislative history of the Lanham Act apparently con-
tains no reference to equitable defenses supplementing the
section 1115(b) defenses.5 9 Although the incontestability provi-
sions generated some legislative discussion,60 congressional ac-
tion on these sections gives little assistance in solving the
equitable defenses problem. The legislative background, how-
ever, clearly indicates that Congress intended the Act to give
new substantive rights to federal trademark holders under cer-
tain circumstances, 61 and the statutory language apparently al-
lows these new rights to be attacked only on limited, specified
grounds.6 2
gressional intent to make the equitable defense of in pari delicto a defense to
private antitrust actions. Perma Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 138 (1968).
59. See 1 J. GnsoN, supra note 7, § 4.03(3) at 4-22 to 4-23 n.48.3. "The best
evidence of Congressional intent is the structure and language of Section 33(b)
[15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) ] itself. Because of the clarity of the section, resort to legis-
lative history, which is more ambiguous than the section, should be unneces-
sary." Id.
For portions of the legislative history of the Lanham Act that specifically
deal with section 1115(b), see Trade-Marks: Hearings on 1.R. 102, H.R. 5461 and
S. 895 Before the House Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Pat-
ents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1941) (statement of Robert W. Byerly); Trade-
Marks: Hearings on S. 895 Before the Senate Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Patents, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, 27 (1942) (statement of W.H. Martin); Hear-
ings on H.R. 102, supra, at 224 (statement of Milton Handler).
A congressional statement that supports the view that equitable defenses
are available against incontestable trademark rights occurred some years after
the passage of the Lanham Act. See S. REP. No. 2266, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10
(1954). Senator Wiley suggested that the antitrust defense to incontestable
trademark rights under section 1115(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (7) (1976), should be
eliminated "since the defense of unclean hands, under which violation of the
antitrust laws would be included, would in any case be available whenever ap-
propriate under the general principles of equity." Id. at 9. Although some
members of the Senate Committee apparently believed that unclean hands is a
defense even against incontestable trademark rights, an analysis of the statu-
tory language suggests differently. See supra text accompanying notes 39-58.
In addition, it is important to remember that this is an ex post facto comment
on the Act, and is consequently no evidence of the intent of the Act's sponsors.
Moreover, it might be argued that because this portion of the 1954 amendment
was never enacted, a majority of the Congress disagreed with Senator-Wiley's
interpretation.
60. See supra citations in note 59.
61. See, e.g., 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Lanham). For a
comprehensive analysis of the substantive clauses, see R. DoLE, supra note 7,
at 42-74.
62. Well-settled rules of statutory construction suggest that a statute
should not be interpreted to conflict with its basic purposes. New York State
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973); E. CRAwFoRD,
supra note 41, § 161 at 249; see supra text accompanying notes 8 & 9 for state-
ments of the Act's goals. The courts have recognized a variety of contexts in
which a statute denies or limits equitable jurisprudence. Restrictions may oc-
cur when "a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable infer-
1078 [Vol. 66:1067
TRADEMARK LITIGATION
B. JUDICIAL TREATMENT
In examining the attitude of the courts toward the availa-
bility of equitable defenses against incontestable trademark
rights, it is useful to divide the cases according to those decided
before and those decided after the Seventh Circuit's landmark
decision in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc.,63 which
not only relied upon, but also affirmatively interpreted the Lan-
ham Act's incontestability provisions.64 The cases decided
prior to Union Carbide are somewhat clouded by the contro-
versy surrounding the unsettled distinction between offensive
and defensive use of incontestable rights.65 None of these opin-
ions provides a clear explanation for its decision on the equita-
ble defenses issue, chiefly because these opinions fail to
characterize or to analyze the problem. The reason for preclud-
ing equitable defenses in Apple Growers Association v. Pelletti
Fruit Co.,66 for example, apparently was based upon a strict
reading of section 1115(b). The court observed that the plain-
tiff's registration of the word "Diamond" and the diamond sym-
bol as applied to fresh apples had become incontestable under
sections 1065 and 1115(b) and thus "exclusively entitled [the
plaintiff] to such use subject to the defenses enumerated in
[section] 1115(b)."67 Because equitable defenses were not
among those enumerated, the court concluded that the statute
did not allow them.68
Other courts prior to Union Carbide appeared to hold that
equitable defenses against incontestable- trademark rights were
available, but in a number of these cases a close examination
ence, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity." Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960) (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S.
395, 397-98 (1946)). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975) ("[Wlhen Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further tran-
scendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of
standards consistent with those purposes .... ").
63. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 74-85; see alo supra note 6.
65. See supra note 5.
66. 153 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
67. Id. at 951.
68. Id. Another California federal district court relied upon Apple Growers
three years later. See Richard Hudnut v. Du Barry of Hollywood, 127 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 486, 489 (S.D. Cal. 1960) ("Under the facts of this case, laches is no de-
fense to a permanent injunction. . ., especially with respect to a trademark
which has become incontestable under the Lanham Act as has the plaintiff's
trademark."). See also General Motors v. Smith, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 382, 384
(S.D. Cal. 1963) (court observed that laches, acquiescence, and estoppel were
unavailable as defenses to trademark registrations that had obtained incontest-
able status).
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reveals that the issue was never squarely presented to the
courts. Although one district court,69 for example, stated that
"[incontestability has no effect on the availability of laches as
a defense," the statement was dictum.70 The court had already
held that incontestability had only a defensive and not an of-
fensive use.7 1 In effect, the court treated the mark as one de-
void of the advantages of incontestability, and thus subject to
"any legal or equitable defense."72
The Union Carbide case, however, resolved the vagaries
that existed in these decisions as a result of the offensive-de-
fensive distinction.7 3 Union Carbide7 4 arose when plaintiff
Union Carbide Corporation, manufacturer of batteries,
flashlights, and miniature light bulbs under the trademark
"Eveready," sued defendant Ever-Ready Incorporated for mar-
keting miniature bulbs for high intensity lamps under the mark
"Ever-Ready." 7 Union Carbide had registered its "Eveready"
mark under the Lanham Act, and its right to use the mark had
become incontestable in accordance with section 1065.76 The
district court dismissed the complaint,77 however, holding that
Union Carbide had failed to establish a valid trademark regis-
tration, and that the defendant's mark was in any event not
likely to cause consumer confusion.7 8 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit rejected both grounds for dismissal, concluding that the
69. Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
70. Id. at 954.
71. Id. at 936.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976). This subsection governs marks that have not
obtained incontestable status. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. The
decision in Haviland regarding incontestability and laches rested in part on
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 820 (1961), an earlier Second Circuit opinion. 269 F. Supp. at 954. In
that case, the court of appeals apparently found sufficient facts to warrant ap-
plication of a sort of equitable prior use exception based on laches, at least
with respect to the goods in question. 287 F.2d at 493, 498. The court was also
unimpressed by the evidence on likelihood of confusion. Id. at 495-96. For an
example of how the "likelihood of confusion" test might embody certain equita-
ble considerations, see Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358 (2d
Cir. 1959) (court appeared to consider equitable principles in applying likeli-
hood of confusion test, at least judged by the result). See generally Fletcher,
The Chextra Case and Other Spawn of Dawn Donut, 66 TRAnE-MAR REP. 285
(1976).
73. See supra note 6. See generally supra note 5.
74. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, 392 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. fl. 1975),
rev'd, 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
75. 531 F.2d at 370-71.
76. Id.
77. 392 F. Supp. at 294.
78. Id. at 289, 294.
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district court had erred in finding the marks dissimilar.7 9 More
importantly, the court of appeals found that the registration
was not invalid as a merely descriptive mark, because that de-
fense was unavailable against marks that had achieved incon-
testable status under section 1115(b).80 The court explicitly
held that a plaintiff in an infringement action could rely upon
the conclusive evidence rule of section 1115(b),81 and that
"[tihe only grounds upon which the validity of the mark could
have been challenged were those enumerated in [section]
1115(b)."82
The Union Carbide court's language seems to suggest that
all defenses not specified in section 1115(b), including equita-
ble defenses, are unavailable to a defendant. The court, how-
ever, discussed the defendant's claim of laches later in the
opinion without applying its earlier conclusion. Although the
court noted that the defense was waived on appeal, and that
the time period would have been insufficient to establish
laches, the court's reference to the equitable defense might in-
dicate a willingness to entertain the defense in the future.83
This conclusion, on the other hand, would contravene the gen-
eral principle of law suggested by Union Carbide: that Con-
gress intended the owner of incontestable trademark rights to
be entitled to the exclusive use of the registered mark subject
only to the seven enumerated defenses. 84 Thus, although the
case had been hailed as "A veritable treatise of United States
trademark law,"85 the decision failed to address explicitly the
additional problem of the availability of equitable defenses in
light of section 1115(b).
Decisions subsequent to Union Carbide have generally
considered the equitable defenses issue only tangentially. In
Cuban Cigar Brands N. V. v. Upmann International, Inc.,86 the
79. 531 F.2d at 388.
80. Id. at 377.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 381.
83. Id. at 388-89. One commentator has suggested that the court might
have been willing to consider laches not as a defense which would merely de-
feat the conclusive presumption, but rather as a complete bar to recovery. See
Note, supra note 5, at 425-26 n.204. Such a distinction, however, does not appear
to be significant. See supra discussion in note 20.
84. The court in United States Jaycees v. Chicago Jr. Ass'n of Com. & In-
dus., 505 F. Supp. 998, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981), recently adopted this interpretation of
section 1115(b). See infra text accompanying notes 90-96.
85. McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition
Law During the Decade of the 1970s, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 93, 106 (1981).
86. 457 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affid, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979).
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court stated in a footnote that both the statute and the cases
clearly establish that laches is a defense even when an owner's
trademark rights have become incontestable.87 Despite the un-
ambiguous import of this assertion, it is dictum. The court ulti-
mately decided the case on the exception to incontestability,
found in section 1065, based upon *the plaintiff's use of the
trademark prior to the defendant's registration, 8 and it ordered
cancellation of the registration pursuant to section 1064(c).89
In contrast, the court in United States Jaycees v. Chicago
Jr. Association of Commerce & IndustrygO squarely dealt with
the availability of equitable defenses, and held that section
1115(b) precluded them.9 ' The defendant asserted eleven af-
firmative defenses to plaintiff's infringement claim, several of
which were equitable,92 but the court sustained a motion to
strike a number of the defenses, including all of the equitable
defenses. 93 The court relied upon a brief statutory analysis,94
its reading of Union Carbide,S5 and a short discussion of the
87. 457 F. Supp. at 1092 n.5.
88. Id. at 1100.
89. Id. at 1100-01. Similarly, the court in Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers
GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1981), granted the possibility that equitable
defenses might be properly raised against a plaintiff-registrant's incontestable
trademark rights. Id. at 847. In that case, however, the court did not feel con-
strained to take a position on the issue, because it found the defendant's claims
of laches, acquiescence, and estoppel "unsubstantiated by the record." Id. at
846. Koppers is representative of a group of cases that undertake an analysis
that is a return to the common law approach, in which a court will discuss an
equitable defense without examining the possible effect of incontestability.
See, e.g., Lambda Electronics v. Lambda Technology, 515 F. Supp. 915, 930
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Burger King Corp. v. Metro Club, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293,
302-03 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co.,
434 F. Supp. 860, 872 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
90. 505 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. IL 1981).
91. Id. at 999. This case is important because it is the first decision after
Union Carbide to hold specifically that equitable defenses are not cognizable
under section 1115(b).
92. The first equitable defense claimed "unclean hands and inequitable
conduct" and the fourth claimed "laches, waiver, estoppel, and acquiescence."
Id. at 1001.
93. Id.
94. The court contrasted the language of section 1115(b), "the effect of
[which] is to foreclose all defenses except the seven defenses specifically enu-
merated in the statute" with the language of section 1115(a), "which specifies
that a registered mark that has not yet become incontestable ... 'shall not pre-
clude an opposing party from proving any legal or equitable defense,"' and con-
cluded that "as a matter of statutory construction alone, it would be justified in
drawing the inference that the kinds of defenses normally available to a de-
fendant in a suit in equity cease to be available once a registered mark crosses
the line into a status of incontestability." Id. at 999.
95. The court read Union Carbide as "establish[ing] conclusively that the
types of defenses traditionally available in the exercise of equitable jurispru-
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problem in a treatise96 to reach its conclusion.
C. PoLicy ANALYSIS
Those who support the use of equitable defenses when in-
contestable trademark rights are involved have offered argu-
ments based upon equitable policy grounds to support their
position. Some have suggested, for example, that the main goal
of incontestability is to protect registrants against those who
have not been vigilant in protecting their rights; thus, incon-
testability should not protect registrants guilty of similar care-
less or negligent behavior.97 Others have maintained that it
would be inappropriate for a court of equity to grant injunctive
relief to a registrant who is guilty of unfair business practices. 98
There are generally two policy reasons for discouraging inequi-
table conduct by private parties. First, allowing equitable de-
fenses promotes the principle of judicial integrity by excluding
from the courts claimants who have acted unfairly or who have
engaged in some form of misconduct.99 Second, it can be ar-
gued that the registrant's misconduct may include business
practices that subvert competition on the merits and result in
decreased market efficiency and additional costs to consum-
ers. 00 By allowing certain equitable defenses, these business
practices arguably may be curtailed. These arguments are rea-
sonable, however, only if it is assumed that the policy of pro-
tecting the public from confusion in the marketplace is
dence are foreclosed in an action for infringement of a valid incontestable Lan-
ham Act registration." Id. In a footnote, the court specifically rejected the
defendant's argument that equitable defenses should be available when the
plaintiff is seeking the essentially equitable relief of an injunction. '"That argu-
ment cannot be sustained, for Union Carbide itself was an injunction case in
which the plaintiff sought no damages." Id. at 999 n.1. The soundness of the
Jaycees court's reading is questionable, however, in light of Union Carbide's
equivocal treatment of the laches defense. See supra text accompanying notes
81-85.
96. 505 F. Supp. at 1000. See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 7, § 4.03(3) at 4-22 to
24.1.
97. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 1205.
98. See, e.g., Diggins, supra note 7, at 195.
99. See 2 J. PoMERoY, supra note 25, at § 398. This equitable doctrine is
based upon the belief that denying relief when such relief would be unfair or
would further some type of misconduct maintains the integrity of the courts.
See 1 R. CALLmAwN, THE LAw oF.TNFAmR CoMPETrIoN TRADEMARKS AND MoNop-
ouEs § 2.27 (4th ed. 1981); Chaffee, supra note 35, at 877; Johnson v. Yellow Cab
Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 402.(1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Cf. Higgins v.
McCrea, 116 U.S. 671, 685 (1886) ("No court will lend its aid to a man who
founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act." (citation omitted)).
100. See J. MILLER, UNFAm COMPETITION 7-8 (1941); see generally Develop-
ments in the Law--Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888 (1964).
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incidental to the policy of enforcing private rights.101
It should be remembered that prohibiting equitable de-
fenses against incontestable substantive rights does not elimi-
nate consideration of equitable principles in fashioning relief
under the Lanham Act.102 In addition, the public benefits from
strong trademark protection. Congress has recognized that
trademarks are the essence of competition, and that they se-
cure to the business community advantages of reputation and
goodwill and prevent the public from being confused. 0 3 The
marketplace validates these observations-trademarks indicate
company source and operate as a convenient symbol by which
past market experience can be related to currently tendered
products. A trademark thus reduces the need to conduct re-
peated searches for information other than for comparative
pricing purposes.104 In addition, trademarks may provide an
accurate prediction of the quality of goods with which the con-
sumer has had no prior market experience, but whose trade-
mark the consumer recognizes.10s As a result, a trademark not
only makes possible the process of distinguishing goods and
services in the market, but may also greatly contribute to the
homogeneity of goods and services, giving the consumer assur-
ance of uniform characteristics through the mark's implicit
guarantee of quality.106
The source identification function of trademarks allows the
consumer to assign responsibility readily for particular altera-
tions in product quality. Underlying this process, of course, is
101. This conclusion, however, would seem to vitiate the purposes ex-
pressed by the Act. See supra text accompanying notes 8 & 9.
102. See supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
103. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 8, at 2-3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV. at 1275. See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text.
104. The total cost of a good to a consumer comprises not only the cost of
the item itself, including a reasonable return on capital, but also the cost of
knowledge about the product. Consumer reliance on the trademark facilitates
market functioning by reducing "search" costs-the cost of the effort expended
by consumers seeking prepurchase information. See generally Nelson, Infor-
mation and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970); Stigler, The Eco-
nomics of Information, 69 J. PoL. ECON. 213 (1961).
105. See infra note 108 and accompanying text; ef. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402
F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[The trademark] makes effective competition pos-
sible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a means through
which the consumer can identify products which please him and reward the
producer with continued patronage. Without some such method of product
identification, informed consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in
quality, could not exist.").
106. See Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 65 TRADE-
MAm REP. 318, 318 (1975). For a discussion of the negative aspects of trade-
marks when used as vehicles for advertising, see infra note 111.
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the assumption that the consumer is justified in relying upon a
trademark as the exclusive legal property of a particular owner,
and that the trademark is intended to indicate the origin of the
goods to which it is affixed. Increasing market complexity,
however, has led to situations in which the consumer remem-
bers the mark itself, rather than the origin of the good or serv-
ice, and the mark becomes the measure of the consumer's
experience. 07 The actual identity of the source of the good is
no longer of primary concern. The trademark effectively re-
places the actual source as the indicia of the quality of a partic-
ular product, and it is the mark itself that becomes the chief
factor in many consumer purchase decisions.108 The trademark
is thus a principal means for generating possible goodwill with
respect to the commodity,109 and has an asset value."10 The
market significance of the goodwill factor is readily apparent,
because that component represents the reasonable expectation
that a product or service will be purchased again.",l
107. Lateral business expansion, mass marketing techniques, and the in-
creased frequency of franchising and licensing make determination of actual
source of origin extremely difficult for the consumer. See Hanak, supra note
106, at 319. See also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
108. See Hanak, supra note 106, at 318; Treece, Trademark Licensing and
Vertical Restraints in Franchising Arrangements, 116 U. PA. L REV. 435, 436-39
(1968).
109. See Lundsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice and Protection, 4 GA. L.
REV. 322, 323 (1970).
110. The Supreme Court has referred to trademarks as "valuable business
assets" and has committed itself to the "policy of the law to protect them as
assets of a business." Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946). Section
177 of the Internal Revenue Code allows for the amortization of acquired trade-
marks. 26 U.S.C. § 177 (1976).
111. See Treece, s-upra note 108, at 437.
The promulgators of the Lanham Act did not explicitly acknowledge that a
function of a trademark is its use as a basis for advertisement and product pro-
motion. Some commentators have suggested that trademarks may be used as a
means to create through advertisement irrational consumer demands and pref-
erences, and that the legal protection given to trademarks may have undesir-
able anti-competitive consequences. Brown, Advertising and the Public
Interest Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169-75 (1948);
Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Powers: A Phenomenon Called 'Product Differen-
tiation,' 18 AM. U.L. Rav. 1, 14-42-(1968); Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and
the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 323 (1949). See also In
re Borden, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 669 (1978) (Federal Trade Commission, in a cancella-
tion proceeding, attacked Borden's "ReaLemon" subsidiary on the grounds that
it had unlawfully monopolized the processed lemon juice market, not only
through geographic price discrimination, but also through the promotion of its
trademark). Opponents of this view contend that advertising is primarily in-
formative and contributes to market efficiency. G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION
OF INDUSTRY 176, 182-86 (1968); Nelson, The Economic Consequences of Advertis-
ing, 48 J. Bus. 213 (1975). See also J. LAMIN, ADVERTISING, COMPETITION AND
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Trademarks are one of the few means of bridging the gap
between the producer and the consumer. Equity, therefore,
should allow courts to exercise the greatest flexibility in accom-
modating consumer as well as private interests."2 By defining
the role of equity in this way, the question of whether equitable
principles should shape substantive rights between private par-
ties, or whether they should only be considered at the remedy
stage, becomes less difficult. Because allowing equitable prin-
ciples to determine substantive rights forces courts to make an
all-or-nothing decision without balancing consumer interests,
such a view conflicts with the Lanham Act's policy to avoid con-
sumer confusion regarding source and product quality." 3 Con-
sequently, the position that equitable defenses should be
permitted to defeat incontestable trademark rights not only
contravenes the results of statutory analysis," 4 but also fails to
accommodate both private and public interests." 5 As the Sev-
MARKET CONDUCT IN OLIGOPOLY OVER TIME (1976). Although trademarks some-
times may be endowed with sales appeal independent of the quality or price of
the products to which they are attached, consumers are unlikely to support an
artificial brand differentiation when the quality of the familiar trademarked ar-
ticle declines substantially. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 817-
18. In addition, those who attack trademarks because of their link to advertis-
ing and potentially irrational consumer preferences assume a role for trade-
mark law that might be handled best in other contexts. There are several
devices available, for example, that may promulgate quality standards in forms
usable by the consumer-informative labeling, grade labeling, and certifications
of quality. See generally Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labeling,
and Grade Labeling as Guides to Consumer Buying, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 362 (1949). It thus seems that even if some negative aspects may result
from the advertising feature of trademarks, they may be corrected without im-
pairing the usefulness of the trademark system as a whole. For a general dis-
cussion of this problem, see McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition" A
Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 305 (1979).
112. See Note, supra note 30, at 122.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 39-62.
115. Both the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Trademark
Trial and Appeals Board have taken this position as a matter of public policy.
See Swank, Inc. v. Ravel Perfume Corp., 438 F.2d 622 (C.C.P.A 1971) (court
noted in dicta that when the competing marks are identical or very similar, eq-
uitable defenses are not applicable, because protection of the public from con-
fusion "is the dominant consideration," id. at 624); Hitachi Metals Int'l v.
Yamakyu Chain Kabushiki Kaisha, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1057 (T.T.B. 1981)
(Board announced a policy of disallowing equitable defenses in registration
contests in which "confusion or mistake is inevitable," and explained that
"[t]he rationale behind [this view] is that public interest necessitates the
avoidance of situations that could readily give rise to confusion in the market-
place," id. at 1067). The legal "defenses or defects" contained within section
1115(b) do not compromise consumer interests in maintaining an unconfusing
marketplace. Instead, each of the defenses is directed at some aspect of public
benefit, rather than strictly toward instances of private misconduct between the
litigants: (1) A defense is allowed when the registration or its incontestable
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enth Circuit has stated:
In the consideration of evidence relating to trademark infringement,
therefore, a court must expand the more frequent, one-on-one, contest-
between-two-sides, approach. A third party, the consuming public, is
present and its interests are paramount....
A "trademark" is not that which is infringed. What is infringed is
the right of the public to be free of confusion and the synonymous right
of a trademark owner to control his product's reputation.116
The deterrence-of-business-misconduct rationale of al-
lowing equitable defenses at the substantive stage is not en-
tirely abrogated by proscribing equitable defenses against
incontestable trademark rights. Not only does section 1115(b)
contain several defenses based on unfair business practices,"17
but also the plaintiff is not immune from challenge for miscon-
duct through other actions or in other forums," 8 and equitable
status was fraudulently obtained. This defense is necessary to insure the in-
tegrity of the national registration system. (2) The trademark is no longer pro-
tectable when a registrant has abandoned a mark. Abandoned marks usually
retain no consumer following, and consequently, confusion from adoption of a
similar mark is improbable. (3) An owner's incontestable rights may be de-
feated when the mark is being used to misrepresent the source of the goods or
services with which the mark is used. Without such a defense, public reliance
on trademarks would be meaningless. (4) A nonregistrant's use of a mark in
his or her own business that is also the nonregistrant's name, or that is descrip-
tive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services
of the nonregistrant or their geographic origin, is permissible. This defense em-
bodies a "fair use" concept, and the portion dealing with the assertion of a de-
scriptive term stems from congressional concern that such marks would
deprive consumers and competitors of the right to use the very name of the
product, obviously distorting the informational value of advertising and con-
sumer purchasing decisions. (5) and (6) The "prior use" defenses essentially
permit a nonregistrant to continue to use a mark in the geographic area in
which such mark was used prior to federal registration by the opposing party.
These provisions protect consumer reliance on a mark that has generated good-
will prior to another's registration and use of the same or similar mark.
(7) The public interest in preventing restraint of trade is sufficiently great to
defeat trademark rights integrally related to an antitrust violation. For a thor-
ough discussion of the evidentiary effect of each of these defenses, see IL DoLE,
supra note 7, at 60-74.
116. James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th
Cir. 1976). See also Note, supra note 30, at 109.
117. See supra notes 20 & 115.
118. In addition to private actions brought by competitors, a plaintiff who
engages in business misconduct may be subject to suits brought by either the
ETC under federal law, or by consumers under state law. See generally Cras-
well, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 107 (1981); Leafier & Lipson, Consumer Actions
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal
Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEo. WASH. L REv. 521 (1980). The
Supreme Court, in an antitrust context, used the argument that other actions
or forums are available in which to challenge certain kinds of business miscon-
duct. See Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
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principles may still be considered by the court when fashioning
a remedy.119 In addition, separate actions or forums arguably
are better suited to dispose of alleged misconduct which is
otherwise cognizable under the defense of unclean hands, be-
cause separate treatment relieves the court deciding the trade-
mark claim of the burden of ruling simultaneously on an array
of collateral issues relating to the alleged misconduct.120 More-
over, allowing the defendant to continue the trademark in-
fringement by closing the doors of the court to the plaintiff
certainly does not eliminate misconduct by the defendant.121
The view that if equity is to serve the purposes of the Lan-
ham Act, its application is only desirable at the remedy stage
when the consumers' market interests can be considered, is not
without parallel in other areas of the law. Specifically, the no-
tion that private conflicts should be removed from equity be-
cause of a competing and overriding public interest finds
support in antitrust doctrine. Most applicable to the current
discussion is the judicial development in antitrust law proscrib-
ing unclean hands and in pari delicto as equitable defenses to
an antitrust claim. 122 The courts have limited the availability of
equitable defenses in private antitrust suits on the ground that
the public benefit derived from enforcing the antitrust laws out-
weighs notions of equity and the interests of the parties.123
One court stated the rationale that "[w]hatever equities may
be present as between private litigants, they must yield to the
overall public policy of the antitrust laws to prevent monopo-
lies and restraint of trade.'" 24 While the refusal to recognize
equitable defenses in private antitrust actions rests upon the
119. See supra note 24.
120. Collateral issues might include any number of common unfair business
practices. These claims arise, for the most part, under state law; other prac-
tices might be left to the expertise of the FTC. See supra citations in note 118.
121. "Protection of infringers is not a purpose of the Lanham Act. On the
contrary, the Act's objective is the protection of the trademark and the public."
United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 1981).
122. See Note, The Viability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Private Anti-
trust Actions, 31 RuTGERS L. Rav. 126 (1977); Comment, Limiting the Unclean
Hands and In Pari Delicto Defenses in Anti-trust Suits: An Additional Justifi-
cation, 54 Nw. U. L REv. 456 (1959).
123. In Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (plu-
rality opinion), the Supreme Court abolished in pari delicto in circumstances in
which the plaintiffs were coerced. The Court held that the policy of enforcing
the antitrust laws, especially through private actions, outweighed equitable
considerations. Id. at 139-40.
124. Trebuhs Realty Co. v News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court denied defense of unclean hands). See also Perma Life
Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. at 139; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
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strong public policy of discouraging activities in restraint of
trade, 25 the public interest in preventing trademark infringe-
ment and the concomitant market confusion it generates is also
strong.126 With the rise in judicial awareness that the need to
protect the public from confusion is a separate consideration in
private trademark litigation,127 courts should also begin to real-
ize that the likelihood of confusion is not simply a test for in-
fringement, but a compelling ground for granting relief.128 The
statute directs the courts to follow equitable principles only in
formulating the scope of the plaintiff's relief, which may be
fashioned to give weight both to the plaintiff's conduct and the
interests of the consumer. 12 9
IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the language of section 1115(b) of the Lan-
ham Act and the other provisions regarding incontestability
supports the conclusion that equitable defenses are unavaila-
ble against a trademark owner's incontestable rights. Such a
construction provides an interpretation consistent with the goal
of national trademark protection and the concomitant benefits
that national protection affords. In addition, the elimination of
equitable defenses to incontestable trademark rights is consis-
tent with antitrust law, in which the prohibition of the defenses
has been justified on the ground of increasing market stability
to the overall benefit of the public. The effect of equity is not
entirely abrogated but is merely shifted, because principles of
equity may still be considered in determining the scope of re-
lief. By eliminating equitable defenses and the drastic result of
an owner's forfeiture of the exclusive right to use a trademark,
the Lanham Act recognizes that the public interest in prevent-
125. The unclean hands defense has also been occasionally proscribed in
marital and fiduciary litigation, when a stronger public policy has favored en-
forcement of the law. See Comment, supra note 122, at 462-64.
126. Although the courts have severely limited equitable defenses in anti-
trust actions, including the plaintiff's own violation of antitrust laws, the Lan-
ham Act explicitly provides that a defendant may raise a plaintiff-registrant's
violation of the antitrust laws as a defense to incontestable trademark rights.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (7) (1976). The defense is not inconsistent with consid-
erations of the maximum public benefit, because it certainly can be argued that
antitrust violations harm the public more than confusion caused by trademark
infringements. For a statement expressing the overriding public policy against
restraints of trade, see Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. at
139-40; supra note 124 and accompanying text.
127. See supra text accompanying note 116.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 103-16.
129. See Note, supra note 30, at 117-18, 122.
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ing consumer confusion is of greater significance than a strict
application of the traditional equity maxim to substantive
rights. Instead the Act reflects the congressional policy favor-
ing competition in the marketplace based upon informed con-
sumer choice.
